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WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Francis Anthony
Boyle. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1985. Pp. xii, 366.
Cloth, $32.50; paper $14.75.

This book arouses great expectations. Francis Boyle brings the
dual qualifications of lawyer and political scientist 1 to this effort to
bridge the gap between the disciplines of international law and international politics;2 his work also comes with an authoritative endorsement as "one of the most important books on international law to
appear in the last decade." 3 All this makes the disappointment even
greater. While not without its interesting and provocative passages,
World Politics and International Law is on the whole a tedious and
poorly written book which deserves to be forgotten.
Boyle's ambition is to show the relevance of international law to
international politics, specifically to those situations of "high politics"
where a state's "vital national interest" is at stake - and where the
relevance of international law is most often doubted. This amounts, in
large part, to an attack on the "political realist" or "power politics"
school of international relations, 4 represented by such figures as
Boyle's undergraduate mentor Hans Morgenthau (whose supposed
volte-face on the importance of international law and organizations
1. Boyle holds the degrees of J.D. and Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University.
He is Professor of Law at the University of Illinois.
2. The book is drawn from the author's doctoral dissertation: F. Boyle, Realism, Positivism,
Functionalism, and International Law (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Univer·
sity). Most of it has already been published in various legal journals. See Boyle, American Foreign
Policy Toward International Law and Organizations: 1898-1917, 6 LOY. L.A. INTL. & COMP.
L.J. 185 (1983); Boyle, International Law as a Basis for Conducting American Foreign Policy:
1979-1982, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 103 (1981); Boyle, International Law in Time of Crisis:
From the Entebbe Raid to the Hostages Convention, 15 Nw. U. L. REV. 769 (1980); Boyle, The

Irrelevance ofInternational Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Poli·
tics, 10 CAL. W. INTL. L.J. 193 (1980); Boyle, The Law ofPower Politics, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 901.
3. Professor Richard Falk, Princeton University (quoted on the back cover).
4. Political realists, according to Boyle, believe that
[t]here are no barriers to the acquisitive nature of the nation state beyond its own inherent
limitations and those constraints imposed upon it by the international political milieu. Con·
sequently, the analysis of international relations must concentrate exclusively upon the dynamics of power politics and the machinations of that metaphysical entity known as the
"balance of power." Considerations of international law do not and should not intrude into
such areas.
Pp. 7-8.
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shortly before his 1980 death (pp. 70-72) is a focal point of the book5)
and Henry Kissinger (whom "the American people should deem ...
to be permanently estopped from ever again offering his pseudo-Machiavellian advice on the proper conduct of U.S. foreign policy" (p.
205)).

The international lawyers also come in for attack. After spending
much of the first part of the book defending "international legal positivism"6 from the realists' charges of naivete, moralizing, and responsibility for the Second World War, Boyle argues that public
international lawyers today have become preoccupied with a "mechanistic determination of the legality or illegality of a proposed or completed course of state conduct" (p. 59). This exclusive focus on right
and wrong tends to make of international law little more than a vehicle for the expression of personal opinion or, worse, a figleaf for "the
legitimization of conduct by one party to an international dispute" (p.
88).
In place of the realist/political scientist's focus on whether states
respect international law, and the positivist/international lawyer's obsession with whether a given action was legal or illegal, Boyle proposes
a "functionalist" analysis which examines the functions performed by
international law "in time of crisis." Following Part One's discussion
of the realist-positivist debate (and the accompanying schism between
the disciplines of international law and international politics), Boyle
proceeds in Part Two to the heart of his book: a case study of the
functions of international law during an international crisis. From
this, the author develops a number of "theoretical propositions" about
the role played by international law and organizations, with a view
5. According to Boyle, Morgenthau told a Harvard seminar in 1978 that in today's world of
nuclear weapons "power politics" could result in the destruction of the human race; the only
solution was world government. P. 70. In 1979 he confided to Boyle his belief that nothing
could be done to halt the momentum toward nuclear war. P. 73. Do these views really represent
an about-face for Morgenthau? In his classic text, Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau sounded
the same themes of the impossibility of peace without world government and the unlikelihood of
attaining world government:
There is no shirking the conclusion that international peace cannot be permanent without a world state ..•. [T]here is also no shirking the further conclusion that in no period of
modem history was civilization more in need of permanent peace and, hence, of a world
state, and that in no period of modem history were the moral, social, and political conditions of the world less favorable for the establishment of a world state.
H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 513 (3d ed. 1960).
6. [T]he elements of the American legal positivist approach to international relations during its classical period from 1898 to 1917 came to consist of attaining the following concrete
objectives: (1) the creation of a general system for the obligatory arbitration of disputes
between states; (2) the establishment of an international court of justice; (3) the codification
of important areas of customary international law into positive treaty form; (4) arms reduction, but only after, not before, the relaxation of international tensions by means of these and
other legalist techniques and institutions; and (5) the institutionalization of the practice of
convoking periodic conferences of all states in the recognized international community.
P. 28.
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ultimately to constructing a theoretical model and making foreign policy prescriptions.
Boyle has chosen for his case study the 1976 Israeli raid at Entebbe
airport (a choice he does not explain). A major problem in this part,
and indeed in the entire work, is that the author does not seem to be
clear on why he is examining Entebbe: Is it in order to develop theoretical generalizations about the role of international law (the stated
purpose), or in order to present a critique of U.S. foreign policy? The
lack of clear purpose is fatal, for the author repeatedly undermines his
theoretical propositions drawn from the Entebbe study with his
counter-examples from American foreign policy. For example, Boyle
makes much of the fact that the Israeli Minister of Justice was appointed to his country's "crisis management team" in order to ensure
that an international-law perspective was presented on an equal basis
with other considerations in the decisionmaking process (pp. 92-93,
98). From this Israeli experience he draws the following "theoretical
proposition" about the role of international law in time of crisis:
"Members of a crisis management team will request the justice minister's opinions on the legality of their proposed courses of conduct, will
accept his opinions as correct, and will weigh his opinions together
with the diplomatic, military, political, and other factors involved in
order to make their decision" (p. 157). Even if one accepts the accuracy of this statement as a description of the Israeli decision-making
process, its value as a generalization is largely undermined by the
counter-examples Boyle - perhaps unwittingly - presents in his critique of the U.S. policy-making process (pp. 92, 202-03). Granted that
the purpose of generalizations at this stage of theory construction is
largely heuri~tic, one must question not only the validity but even the
usefulness of such a clearly contradicted generalization - particularly
when the author does not even appear to recognize the contradiction.
The problem is not limited to this example. In Part Three, Boyle
presents an extensive critique of the "lawlessness" of U.S. foreign policy. Much of what is said there seems to run directly counter to the
generalizations drawn from Entebbe, which emphasize the role played
by international law (pp. 157-59). These Part Two propositions were
to have general application, so as to serve as a first step toward the
construction of theory, but one wonders how different they might have
been had Boyle drawn them not from Entebbe, but from the Iranian
hostage crisis, for example, where he appears to have a quite different
view of the role played by international law (pp. 183-203).
Even limited to the facts of his Entebbe case study, some of Boyle's
central propositions seem questionable. For example, he purports to
have shown that "considerations of international law and organizations do in fact play a crucial role in governmental decision-making
processes during times of international crisis" (p. 100). In regard to
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the crucial Israeli decision to launch a military raid, Boyle has, if anything, shown just the opposite. He is able to make his case for the role
of international law only because of the way he frames the Israeli options. In Boyle's account, Israel had three basic alternatives: (1) not
to undertake a military raid; (2) to launch a raid without having
brought the matter to the U.N. Security Council; and (3) to take the
crisis to the Security Council, at the risk of having to launch a raid
while the Council was debating or after it had passed a resolution urging nonrecourse to force (p. 96). The first option, says Boyle, was not
viable in view of Israel's central concerns. Option Two was then chosen over Option Three because it "minimized the force of any allegations that [Israel] had violated international law" (p. 96). But was not
the really central question whether or not to intervene militarily?
Once that decision was made, the question of whether or not to go to
the Security Council was a secondary, tactical matter. And Boyle
makes clear that the central decision to use military force was based
on considerations other than internatonal law: "The physical survival
of approximately one hundred Israeli nationals or dual nationals was
perceived to be at stake and, with them, the very ability of the state of
Israel to ensure its own existence. . . . So the first option was discarded
..." (p. 97).
Boyle's efforts to generalize from the Entebbe crisis are not wholly
without value. Chapter Eight on Security Council "adjudication" of
the dispute contains some nice insights on the existence of a fundamental international consensus on essential points beneath surface inability to agree on a resolution (pp. 108-18). Chapter Nine argues that
the Israeli-Ugandan dispute following the Entebbe raid was effectively
"resolved" by the Security Council's "non-action," which served to
legitimize the status quo and break the cycle of violence (p. 124) although one wonders whether this would have been true had Uganda
in fact possessed the means of retaliation against Israel. And the notion that a state's action must fall within a "penumbra of legality" in
order successfully to resolve a crisis (p. 161) is suggestive, as is Boyle's
discussion of the role of success and failure in the modification of international legal rules. 7
Part Three is prescriptive. Examining a number of issues in recent
U.S. foreign policy - notably the Iranian hostage crisis, the death of
detente, nuclear arms control, and crises in the Caribbean and Central
America - Boyle urges abandonment of "Machiavellian power politics" as a basis for U.S. policy and reliance instead on the principles of
international law and organization. Quite correctly, Boyle points out
7. "A pattern of successful political action creates new legal rules through legitimization of
that state behavior by lack of effective political opposition to it. An accumulation of political
failures also creates Jaw by generating political pressures to establish legal rules prohibiting the
unsuccessful political conduct in the future." P. 134.
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that strengthening the role of international law can only serve the interests of a status quo power like the United States (pp. 175, 179). An
American foreign policy informed by the principles of international
law and organization would promote not only world order, but also
the more narrowly defined American national interest. 8
There is some stimulating material to be found here, notably a provocative legal justification for the Iranian seizure of the American hostages in 1979 (pp. 188-90). Otherwise, however, there is little new in
this forceful polemic. 9 Much as one may agree with Boyle's evaluation
of recent U.S. foreign policy, one is forced to ask whether it was necessary to write the entire book to articulate this critique. What Boyle
has to say could have been based just as well on a purely political
analysis of America's enlightened self-interest, with little reference to
international law.
One is left with the impression, in fact, that most of Part Three
could have been written without any reference to the rest of the book.
Apart from a general notion of the importance and relevance of international law, it is hard to see how Part Three either builds on or draws
from what has preceded it. Indeed, the opposite is more nearly true.
Not only does much of what Boyle has to say about the role ofinternational law in U.S. foreign policy directly contradict the propositions he
has developed in Part Two (see above), but most of his Part Three
analysis would seem to be a prime example of the positivist's "obsessive preoccupation with the determination of legality or illegality" (p.
79), which he so strenuously denounces in Part Two as an inappropriate approach for the international lawyer. 10
World Politics and International Law, then, promises much but de8. The argument is not a new one. See, e.g.• J. PERKINS, THE PRUDENT PEACE (1981).
9. A polemical tone is not necessarily inappropriate, but certain elements of style become
irritating, such as the incessant use of the phrase "should have." One particularly egregious
paragraph uses this phrase no less than eight times. See p. 225.
10. For examples of "positivist" analysis, see pp. 212, 215, 219, 272-73, 283, and virtually all
of Chapter 17. In a rare instance where Boyle's Part Two generalizations do inform his Part
Three analysis, the result is little short of bizarre. In evaluating the abortive U.S. hostage rescue
attempt in Iran, Boyle borrows from the Israeli Entebbe experience to conclude that a "promising initiative" would be to mandate by statute the inclusion of the Attorney General in any crisis
management team, so that "international law and organizations would gain their own personal
advocate to compete for influence over the formulation of American foreign policy with those
leaders advocating reliance instead on Machiavellian power politics." P. 203. In the Entebbe
experience, the Israeli Justice Minister's role was, in fact, to assure his colleagues that an international-law justification of their proposed course of action could be constructed. It is hard to see
what would be gained by having the U.S. Attorney General, rather than the State Department's
Office of the Legal Advisor, provide such fig leaves. And it is difficult to imagine that the Attorney General would in fact be a real "advocate" for international law. Completely apart from
questions about the devotion of some recent Attorneys General to any law, international or municipal, there are institutional considerations. Boyle's instinct to look at the decision-making
process from a bureaucratic perspective is correct as far as it goes. But since advocacy of the
interests of international law and organizations is hardly what the Justice Department sees as its
"organizational essence," it is difficult to imagine that the department would devote any signifi·
cant resources to this effort. Cf M. HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

February-April 1986]

Law, Government, and Society

1005

livers relatively little. A "functionalist" approach to international law
undoubtedly could contribute much to our understanding of the relationship between international law and international politics. Unfortunately, however, one is forced to agree that "[t]he value of this book
lies primarily in giving the reader a real insight into several important
issues of today that are familiar to most people only from newspaper
headlines and television news." 11 Boyle surely was aiming higher than
this.

-JohnM West

28-40 (1974). Moreover, having little role in implementing most foreign policy decisions, the
Justice Department would have little political weight in the decision-making process.
11. The quotation is from the Foreword by Professor Louis Sohn. P. x.

